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I. INTRODUCTION
1

California’s prison system is the largest of any state. As of the end of May
2011, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
2
housed roughly 147,000 adult inmates within its institutions, which exceeds their
3
designed holding capacity by 175 percent. The system as a whole was designed
4
to hold approximately 84,000 inmates. Over the past several decades,
5
California’s prison population has increased dramatically. Some commentators
attribute much of this expansion to the adoption of pro-punishment sentencing
policies that have done little to further public safety or reduce recidivism but
instead have racked up costs and decreased safety and access to necessary
6
services within the prisons themselves.
Through a series of class-action lawsuits brought by CDCR inmates
challenging the constitutionality of the prison system’s medical and mental
healthcare, the federal courts took notice of California’s overcrowded prisons and
7
state lawmakers’ unwillingness to address them. After making their way through

1. Sara Mayeux, Mass Incarceration: Breaking Down the Data by State, PRISON L. BLOG (July 13,
2010, 6:37 AM), http://prisonlaw.wordpress.com/2010/07/13/mass-incarceration-breaking-down-the-data-bystate/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
2. DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., MONTHLY REPORT OF POPULATION AS OF
MIDNIGHT MAY 31, 2011, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_
Information_Services_Branch/Monthly/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad1105.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONS CRISIS: TIME IS RUNNING OUT
17 (2007), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/185/Report185.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (“[F]rom 1980 to 2006, the inmate population surged more than 600 percent, adding an average of
5,500 inmates a year.”).
6. See id. at 17–21. The Commission found that the sentencing policies employed in California since
1980 led to a six-hundred percent increase in those incarcerated in state, which “threatens safety of prison staff
and inmates and obstructs the efficient delivery of services needed to prepare inmates for parole and prevent
recidivism.” Id. at 17–18. Additionally, the study showed that, during the same period, the CDCR’s budget has
expanded from about four percent of California’s budget to about eight percent, from about $1 billion to $9
billion per year. Id. at 21; see also Michael Vitiello & Clark Kelso, A Proposal for a Wholesale Reform of
California’s Sentencing Practice and Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 903, 917 (2004) (calling California’s
sentencing laws “a Byzantine sentencing scheme without a coherent penal philosophy”).
7. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL 2430820, at *4 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (“Although California’s existing prison system serves neither the public nor the inmates
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the federal courts, the cases reached the United States Supreme Court in
8
consolidated form.
In Brown v. Plata, the Court affirmed a lower court’s declaration that
California’s prison-healthcare system was so inadequate in meeting the needs of
inmates that it violated the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and
9
unusual punishment. A divided Court found the primary cause of the system’s
10
inadequacy to be the extreme overcrowding of inmates. It also held that given
California’s current bleak fiscal outlook, the only feasible way of remedying the
11
constitutional violation was to cut the incarcerated population drastically. In
affirming the order of a special three-judge panel convened under the Prison
12
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the Court stated that California must reduce its
prison population to no more than 137.5% of capacity within the next two years,
13
a reduction of between 38,000–46,000 prisoners. This mandate, along with
14
California’s budgetary woes, has “dragged the state’s political class into a long
15
delayed reckoning with [the] fatally flawed penal system.”
California’s plan to meet the Court’s mandate came in the form of AB 109,
dubbed “the 2011 Realignment Legislation addressing public safety”
16
(Realignment). Proclaimed as the biggest change to California’s criminal law
17
since the passage of Determinate Sentencing in 1978, Realignment seeks to
18
reduce California’s high recidivism rates and institutional costs, through
well, the state has for years been unable or unwilling to implement the reforms necessary to reverse its
continuing deterioration.”).
8. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). The Eight Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
9. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1947.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006).
13. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928.
14. See The 2011–12 Budget: California’s Fiscal Outlook, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (Nov. 10,
2010), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2010/bud/fiscal_outlook/fiscal_outlook_2010.aspx#chap1 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (stating California’s budget deficit of about $20 billion will persist for the next several
years).
15. Jonathan Simon, California Penal Policy: Realignment and Beyond, BERKELEY BLOG (Oct. 11,
2011), http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2011/10/11/california-penal-policy-realignment-and-beyond/ (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
16. AB 109, 2011 Leg., 2011–2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011). In addition to AB 109, Realignment is comprised
of several other bills, including AB 116, AB 117, AB 118, and AB 94. See GARRICK BYERS, REALIGNMENT
15–16 (2011), available at http://www.claraweb.us/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/California-Public-SafetyRealignment-Analysis-by-Garrick-Byers-December-19-2011-Edition-3.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (detailing what bills comprise Realignment’s reforms).
17. Robert Weisberg, California’s De Facto Sentencing Commissions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 1
(2011), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/californias-de-facto-sentencing-commissions (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
18. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 2010 CDCR ADULT INSTITUTIONS
OUTCOME EVALUATION REPORT 3 (2010), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult_Research_Branch
/Research_Documents/ARB_FY0506_Outcome_Evaluation_Report.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
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“realigning” the State’s incarceration practices by focusing on localized
19
punishment for many offenders. The main feature of Realignment is to redefine
20
sentencing for many low-level felonies, or “non-non-nons,” by having offenders
21
carry out their sentences in local county jails instead of state prisons. Additional
major changes include increased sentence-reduction credits for county jail
inmates and an overhaul of the State’s parole system, shifting would-be parolees
22
to post-release supervision within their own counties.
Additionally,
Realignment requires each of the State’s fifty-eight counties to set up a
Community Corrections Partnership (CCP) to create a plan for the county to meet
23
Realignment’s new demands, effectively creating fifty-eight separate de facto
24
sentencing commissions.
25
Many see Realignment’s plan as a step in the right direction for California,
26
including the Supreme Court, which alluded to the law’s passage in Plata.
However, others claim that the plan will create a massive public safety hazard for
27
the State’s counties. Regardless, the true issue is whether this new, untested
Review) (reporting that, during the fiscal year of 2005–2006, 67.5% of all inmates released by CDCR returned
to prison within three years).
19. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(5) (West Supp. 2012) (“Realigning low-level felony offenders who
do not have prior convictions for serious, violent, or sex offenses to locally run community-based corrections
programs, which are strengthened through community-based punishment, evidence-based practices, improved
supervision strategies, and enhanced secured capacity, will improve public safety outcomes among adult felons
and facilitate their reintegration back into society.”).
20. A “non-non-non felony” is the informal moniker given to felonies sentenced with jail time because
the legislature considers them to be non-serious, non-violent, and non-PC-290 registerable crimes. BYERS,
supra note 16, at 11.
21. PENAL § 1170(h)(2); see also BYERS, supra note 16 (detailing the changes AB 109 makes to
California’s sentencing scheme).
22. PENAL § 3451.
23. Id. § 1230(b)(1).
24. Weisberg, supra note 17, at 6.
25. See Nick Wilson, Jail Realignment Could Mean Less Recidivism, Expert Says, SAN LUIS OBISPO
TRIB. (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.sanluisobispo.com/2011/10/17/1800391/jail-realignment-could-meanless.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that Realignment could lead to recidivism
reduction); Jonathan Shapiro, Op-Ed, L.A.’s Prison Realignment Opportunity, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/12/opinion/la-oe-1012-shapiro-realignment-20111012 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (“If done right, realignment could revolutionize and repair the incarceration-only
policies that have led to both the nation’s highest costs per inmate and the nation’s highest state recidivism
rate.”).
26. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011) (“The State has already made significant progress
toward reducing its prison population, including reforms that will result in shifting ‘thousands’ of prisoners to
county jails.”).
27. See Kevin Yamamura, Jerry Brown’s Prison Plan Under Fire from Republicans, Democrats Alike,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.sacbee.com/2011/10/16/3983172/jerry-browns-prison-planunder.html#mi_rss=Top%20Stories (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (restating the opinions held by
some high-ranking county officials that Realignment will undoubtedly lead to more crime); Michael D.
Antonovich, AB 109 Is Set to Bankrupt Counties, Jeopardize Citizens, DAILY NEWS L.A. (June 26, 2011),
http://www.dailynews.com/opinions/ci_18371169 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that
shifting the correctional burden onto the counties will lead to overcrowded jails, increased county costs, and an
overall reduction in public safety).
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plan will solve California’s penal woes and stand as a model system for
community-centric corrections for other states. This Comment argues that
Realignment will create challenges for California’s counties, but the State can
lessen the impact of those challenges if the legislature implements (1) financial
incentives that encourage alternatives to jail time and (2) a statewide uniform
actuarial risk assessment tool that is standardized enough to create consistency in
sentencing, but flexible enough to meet the needs of the individual counties.
Part II examines the federal courts’ action and California’s inaction leading
up to the Plata decision, as well as the decision itself. Part III analyzes the
changes to California’s penal law made by Realignment. This Part describes the
provisions in the new law that will likely prove most successful in achieving
California’s goals. Part IV analyzes some of the challenges that California’s
counties will face in their attempt to implement Realignment’s current
formulation. Lastly, Part V discusses how the State can shift its incentive
structure to guide counties towards increasing the use of proven nonincarceration interventions. In addition, this Part advocates for the development
of a uniform actuarial risk instrument that judges and other county officials
would be required to use in making sentencing decisions. In developing the
instrument’s contents, this Comment looks to Virginia, the first state to
28
implement such an instrument, as well as other factors that are specific to
counties with certain population characteristics.
II. FORCING CHANGE: FEDERAL COURT ACTION SPURRED BY STATE INACTION
Realignment did not simply appear out of the ether; rather, its reforms to
California’s penal law are a response to over thirty years of prior sentencing law
29
and a series of federal civil rights cases brought by California prisoners. In this
Part, this Comment explains some of the history behind California’s sentencing
regime leading up to the enactment of Realignment, how that regime led to a
swell in prison population, and the federal litigation that forced California
lawmakers to address the prison population boom.
A. The Catalyst: Thirty Years of New Sentencing Laws
For most of the twentieth century, California employed an “indeterminate”
sentencing scheme, a system that sentenced most offenders for a very broad term,
such as one year to life, with a parole board periodically reviewing inmates to

28. See generally BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA: A THREE-STAGE
EVALUATION (2002), available at http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/risk_off_rpt.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (discussing the development of the risk assessment instrument in Virginia).
29. See infra Part II.A–C (detailing the historical and legal background of Realignment’s enactment).
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30

determine whether they are sufficiently rehabilitated to reintegrate into society.
In 1977, California reversed this sentencing scheme when it enacted its
31
determinate sentencing law, paralleling similar developments occurring across
32
the nation. Under determinate sentencing, the penological purpose behind
33
incarceration shifted from rehabilitation to punishment. California's determinate
sentencing law operates by providing three different possible time periods for
34
incarceration that a convicted person can face: a lower, middle, or upper term.
35
As enacted in 1977, the law required a judge to sentence a convicted offender to
the middle term unless the judge found aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
36
which would lead to an upper- or lower-term sentence, respectively. The law’s
principal drafter acknowledged that “only future experience can provide any
37
definitive answers” as to whether incarceration rates would rise.
Now, after thirty years of “future experience,” we know definitively that
38
incarceration rates have increased exponentially. Many blame determinate
sentencing, at least in part, for the prison population explosion over the past
several decades—an expansion from around 20,000 inmates before the law’s
39
passage to about 160,000 as of late 2011. Governor Jerry Brown, who
advocated for and signed the determinate sentencing law, now acknowledges it as
30. Sara Mayeux, California Sentencing Law: What a Long, Strange Trip It’s Been, PRISON L. BLOG
(Feb. 9, 2010, 7:28 PM), http://prisonlaw.wordpress.com/2010/02/09/california-sentencing-law-what-a-longstrange-trip-its-been/ [hereinafter California Sentencing Law] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
31. Id.
32. See PAMALA L. GRISET, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: THE PROMISE AND REALITY OF RETRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE 39 (1991) (stating that all fifty states and the District of Columbia enacted or considered enacting
legislation between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s to replace their old sentencing schemes with determinate
sentencing).
33. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012) (“The Legislature finds and declares that the
purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.”).
34. California Sentencing Law, supra at note 30.
35. The U.S. Supreme Court declared a portion of the 1977 version of the law unconstitutional under the
Sixth Amendment in 2007. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007). In Cunningham, the Court held that
judge-made factual determinations regarding sentence-elevating aggravating factors violate a defendant’s right
to trial by jury. Id. at 274. California has since amended its determinate sentencing law to place such
determinations in the hands of the jury, but determinations of mitigating factors by the judge and the three-tier
term system from the 1977 law are still in place. PENAL § 1170(a)(3).
36. April Kestell Cassou & Brian Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers
Game, 9 PAC. L.J. 5, 23 (1978).
37. Id. at 30.
38. See JOAN PETERSILIA, CAL. POLICY RESEARCH CTR., UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS
62 (2006), available at http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/pdf/UnderstandingCorrectionsPetersilia20061.pdf
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that California’s prison population began to drastically rise
after the passage of the determinate sentencing legislation); Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520
LKK JFM P, 2009 WL 2430820, at *20 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (“The expansive growth of the prison
population in California is due, in part, to the state’s adoption of determinate sentencing in the 1970s . . . .”).
39. PETERSILIA, supra note 38, at 62; see also Elliot Currie, “Realigning” Criminal Justice in
California: Real Reform, or Shifting the Deck Chairs?, DISSENT.ORG (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.
dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=554 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that that increased
sentence terms, in addition to the “Three Strikes” law, led to the dramatic increase in population).
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“‘an abysmal failure . . . [creating] a scandalous merry-go-round of crime [that
40
has] . . . saddled California with parolees who are ill prepared for release.’” The
requirement that all ex-felons be placed on parole resulted in many being sent
41
back to prison for minor violations. This created a game of “catch and release”
that retained a population of minor repeat offenders while new offenders further
42
added to the prison population. Determinate sentencing, and various laws
passed pursuant to it, played a role in the extreme prison population rise,
43
resulting in high recidivism rates and a “revolving door” for many offenders.
Since the enactment of determinate sentencing, the California Legislature has
passed a large number of crime bills, enacted in response to media stories about
sensational crimes, imposing sentence enhancements that lead to more
44
convictions and longer sentences. This trend, along with the passage of the
“Three Strikes” law in 1994 (under which more than one-quarter of all of
45
California’s incarcerated are currently serving extended or life sentences),
constitutes the legal backdrop to the increasing population that paved the road to
the Plata litigation and California’s eventual reaction in the form of
46
Realignment.
B. The Road to Plata: Coleman v. Schwarzenegger as a Federal Reaction to a
Swelling Prison Population
Within two decades of the implementation of determinate sentencing, the
federal courts began to hear Eighth Amendment claims filed by California
inmates regarding the declining institutional conditions as a result of the increase
47
in prison population. Initiating their case in 1990, the class of inmate plaintiffs
in Coleman claimed that the mental health services within CDCR’s facilities
were so inadequate that they violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and
48
unusual punishment. In 2001, another set of plaintiffs raised a similar claim in
Plata with respect to the CDCR’s ability to administer general medical care to

40. PETERSILIA, supra note 38, at 61 (alterations in original).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 71.
43. See id. at 61–64 (explaining that a determinate sentence gives inmates little incentive to rehabilitate
themselves while incarcerated, thus leading to high recidivism rates).
44. Id. at 61–62.
45. CAL. BUDGET PROJECT, STEADY CLIMB: STATE CORRECTIONS SPENDING IN CALIFORNIA 8 (2011),
available at http://www.cbp.org/pdfs/2011/110914_Corrections_Spending_BB.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
46. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL 2430820, at *19–20
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (explaining which of California’s penal policies, including determinate sentencing,
have led to the rise in prison population that formed the basis for the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim).
47. E.g., Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
48. Id.
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49

the inmate population. In both cases, the courts granted injunctive relief
requiring the CDCR to take remedial measures to bring its inmate health services
50
up to Eighth Amendment standards. In Coleman, the court appointed a special
51
master to oversee compliance with the order, while Plata ended in settlement
with the CDCR stipulating to bring its medical care up to Eighth Amendment
52
standards.
While some minor improvements occurred in the years following each of
these cases, the federal courts still found that California’s prison-healthcare
53
system fell short of constitutional standards. This led to the court appointing a
federal receiver in Plata to “provide leadership and executive management of the
54
California prison medical health care delivery system,” and the court issuing
over seventy court orders in Coleman regarding the progress of the remedial
55
measures. Despite the federal oversight and the CDCR’s continued efforts
towards compliance, by the time Coleman and Plata were consolidated under the
56
PLRA, the federal court found that the continued severe overcrowding of
California’s prisons rendered achieving constitutional compliance unattainable
57
without a more drastic order.
In Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, the special three-judge court made an
unprecedented order for the reduction of the inmate population from almost 190
58
percent of designed capacity to 135.7 percent within two years. The court
determined that the primary reason behind the constitutional deficiencies in care
59
was the extensive overcrowding in the CDCR’s adult facilities. The court found

49. Plata v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing the claim made by the plaintiffs in
the initial Plata class action).
50. Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1324; Plata, 329 F.3d at 1104.
51. Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1324.
52. Order Adopting Class Action Stipulation as Fair, Reasonable and Adequate at 3, Plata v. Davis, No.
C-01-1351 TEH (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2002).
53. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL 2430820, at *3–19 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (chronicling the procedural history of both Plata and Coleman).
54. Id. at *11 (citation omitted).
55. See id. at *15 (stating that the orders were directed towards specific issues such as having adequate
beds, space, and staff available for those inmates at the higher levels of the mental health care delivery system).
56. In 2007, the plaintiffs in both class actions brought motions to convene a three-judge panel pursuant
to the PLRA that would consider whether a more drastic “prisoner release order” should be made by the courts
in order to remedy the violations. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH, 2007 WL 2122657, *6 (N.D.
Cal. July 23, 2007); Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2007 WL 2122636, *30–31
(E.D. Cal. July 23, 2007). Under the PLRA, a special three-judge court may convene and order a mandatory
reduction of prison population when a court has previously entered into an order for less intrusive relief and the
defendant has had a reasonable amount of time to comply with the previous orders, but has yet to do so. 18
U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A) (2006).
57. Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *2 (“[O]vercrowding in California’s prisons render[s] the efforts of
the courts, the Coleman Special Master, and the Plata Receiver utterly insufficient.”).
58. Id. at *116.
59. Id. at *2.
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60

that the only feasible remedy was a population reduction, which satisfied the
61
prerequisites for such an order under the PLRA. Additionally, the court
recognized that the overcrowding led to an environment where “high-risk
inmates do not rehabilitate and low-risk inmates learn new criminal behavior,”
thus leading to a high recidivism rate and a public threat of prisoners leaving
62
incarceration as greater threats to society than when they had first entered. It
also found that population reduction would be feasible through means that would
63
not adversely affect public safety and the criminal justice system. The court
suggested population-reduction measures including: the expansion of the use of
good time credits for early release and evidence-based rehabilitative programs;
diversion of technical parole violators and low risk and short-term offenders to
county jails and other local programs instead of prisons; and other sentencing
64
reforms. Although some of these suggested reforms would make their way into
65
the Realignment legislation, California initially resisted this order by appealing
66
to the U.S. Supreme Court.
C. The Tipping Point: Brown v. Plata
During oral arguments in Plata, Justice Kennedy, responding to arguments
made by the attorney for California, stated, “the problem . . . is that at some point
the court has to say: You’ve been given enough time; the constitutional violation
67
still persists, as the State itself acknowledges.” The tenor of this statement
pervades Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion upholding the three-judge court’s
68
reduction order. The opinion highlights the urgency and persistence of the
constitutional violations created within California’s prisons due to overcrowding
69
by using a multitude of shocking anecdotes from the factual record. To
emphasize the effect of overcrowding on the healthcare violations, Justice
60. Id.
61. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (describing the requirements under the PLRA for a court
to issue a release order).
62. Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *86–87.
63. Id. at *88.
64. Id. at *87–99.
65. See BYERS, supra note 16, at 13–20 (explaining the changes Realignment makes, including
expanding the use of “good time” credits and the diversion of parole violators to short-term incarceration in
county jails).
66. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
67. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (No. 09–1233).
68. E.g., Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1930 (“Both were given ample time to succeed. When the three-judge court
was convened, 12 years had passed since the appointment of the Coleman Special Master, and 5 years had
passed since the approval of the Plata consent decree. The State does not claim that either order achieved a
remedy.”).
69. See id. at 1924 (“A psychiatric expert reported observing an inmate who had been held in . . . a cage
for nearly 24 hours, standing in a pool of his own urine, unresponsive and nearly catatonic. Prison officials
explained they had ‘no place to put him.’”).

489

07_DUCART_VER_10_07-12-12_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

3/29/2013 10:15 AM

2013 / Go Directly to Jail
Kennedy included photos in the opinion depicting the cramped living conditions
70
present in several California prisons.
In rejecting the argument that the lower court did not give California enough
time for its prior remedial measures to show results, the Court recognized that,
without a nudge from the federal judiciary towards more drastic and inventive
efforts, the State’s previous measures would not remedy the constitutional
71
violations within a reasonable timeframe. However, realizing the complexity of
conducting such a large population reduction safely, as well as the sensitive
72
federalism issue, the Court gave state officials discretion in how to meet the
73
mandate. Additionally, the Court stated that the mandate’s timeline and terms
are open to modification if the State showed that such a modification would be
74
necessary or desirable. These terms of the order, as one commentator puts it,
“nudge[s] the state toward sustainable change while balancing the need for time
75
to devise orderly, considered reforms to mitigate safety concerns.”
III. CALIFORNIA’S SOLUTION: THE LEGISLATURE’S PLAN FOR “REALIGNMENT”
With the passage of AB 109 on April 4, 2011, California began its attempt to
reform its unsustainable and constitutionally infirm sentencing structure by
76
making a series of largely unprecedented changes to California’s penal laws.
This Part discusses several of the major changes Realignment makes to
California’s sentencing scheme and explains why several of these changes will
contribute to Realignment’s chance at becoming a model scheme for communitycentric corrections.
Most of the reforms to California’s sentencing structure made by
77
Realignment went into operation on October 1, 2011. Realignment has three
related goals: cutting the recidivism rate, reducing costs, and improving public

70. See id. at 1949–50 (depicting inmate living arrangements at several institutions, with groups of
inmates living almost on top of one another).
71. See id. at 1931 (“The Coleman and Plata courts had a solid basis to doubt that additional efforts to
build new facilities and hire new staff would achieve a remedy. Indeed, although 5 years have now passed since
the appointment of the Plata Receiver and approval of the revised plan of action in Coleman, there is no
indication that the constitutional violations have been cured.”).
72. See Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 599 F.3d 985, 995 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[U]nless a state law is found to
violate a federal law, or unless the Injunction is found necessary to remedy a constitutional violation, federalism
principles require the reconciliation of the state law and federal injunction. . . . [T]he scope of federal injunctive
relief against an agency of state government must always be narrowly tailored to enforce federal constitutional
and statutory law only.”).
73. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1943.
74. Id. at 1947.
75. Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 581,
620 (2012).
76. AB 109, 2011 Leg., 2011–2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011).
77. BYERS, supra note 16, at 13.
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safety. The legislative purpose behind the reforms is not to reduce the prison
79
population; however, in pursuing its goals through the changes it makes to the
80
law, Realignment will lead to some reduction. California’s legislature
acknowledges this inevitability by admitting that the prior correctional policy
centered on incarceration, increased spending, and prison construction does not
81
work because the result was an unsustainable increase in the prison population.
The passage of AB 109, the main body of Realignment’s legislation, occurred
just prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Plata and incorporates several of
the changes suggested by the Coleman court, making it clear that the pending
Plata decision and the continued pressure from the lower federal courts played a
82
role in Realignment’s formulation.
A. Realignment’s Major Changes to California’s Penal Law
1. The Creation of County Jail Felonies
The biggest alteration Realignment makes to California’s sentencing
83
structure is the creation of county jail felonies. Prior to Realignment, all felony
offenses required serving incarceration in prison, including low-level offenses
84
requiring only one year or more of confinement. By rebranding the majority of
non-violent and other low-level felony offenses as county jail felonies, violators
of these crimes now serve all or part of their sentences in a jail in the county in
85
which they are convicted. During sentencing, judges have the discretion to
sentence those convicted of county jail felonies to jail with no post-release
supervision or to spend only part of their time in jail and the remainder under the
86
supervision of a county probation officer. Determinate sentencing’s triad of
possible term times still applies to most county jail felonies, including any that do
87
not state a mandatory term time in the statute for the underlying offense.
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5 (West Supp. 2012).
79. Id. § 17.5(b).
80. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., FACT SHEET: 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT 1 (2011),
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/Realignment-Fact-Sheet.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (stating that Realignment is the cornerstone of California’s effort to reduce its prison population).
81. PENAL § 17.5(a)(1)–(5).
82. See Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Governor, Cal. State, to the Members of the Cal. State Assembly
(Apr. 4, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that Governor Brown signed AB 109 into law,
in part, because the new law will reverse the aggravation of prison crowding created by the prior sentencing
regime).
83. PENAL § 17(a); id. § 1170(h).
84. Burr v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 350 F.2d 87, 90 (9th Cir. 1965) (“[A] felony in
California ‘is a crime punishable by a state prison sentence . . . .’”).
85. PENAL § 1170(h)(5).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 1170(h)(1) (“[A] felony punishable [as a county jail felony] where the term is not specified in
the underlying offense shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment in a county jail for 16 months, or two or
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The legislature’s reasoning behind the shift in the location of incarceration is
that “[r]ealign[ment of] low-level felony offenders . . . will improve public safety
outcomes among adult felons and facilitate their reintegration back into
88
society.” Although the full effect of Realignment’s changes are not expected to
be completely realized until 2015, some within California’s government credit
the diversion of low-level inmates for the roughly 7,000 prison inmate reduction
89
experienced two months after Realignment’s implementation. This development
contributes to the optimism that Realignment will be sufficient to meet the Plata
90
mandate, in addition to meeting its other goals.
2. The Placement of Most of Those Released from Prison on Post-Release
Community Supervision Instead of Parole
Under Realignment, certain felonies are exempt from being carried out in
county jail; instead, they are required to be served in prison, just as they would
91
have under California’s prior sentencing scheme. These “state prison felonies”
include crimes the legislature deems serious, violent, or sex offenses requiring
92
registration under California Penal Code section 290. Additionally, anyone who
commits any of the almost eighty other offenses that do not fall into the above
categories, or who has prior convictions for any of the above offenses, is required
93
to serve time in prison instead of jail.
Though little has changed under Realignment regarding time spent in prison
for these crimes, what has changed is what happens to many of those imprisoned
94
for these crimes when they are released. Under Realignment’s Postrelease
Community Supervision Act, all released prisoners with a conviction offense not
requiring parole under Penal Code section 3451(b) are subject to Postrelease

three years.”).
88. Id. § 17.5(a)(5).
89. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CORRECTIONS YEAR AT A GLANCE FALL 2011, at 5–6 (2011),
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/2011_Annual_Report_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter CDCR YEAR AT
A GLANCE] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
90. See id. at 5 (stating that CDCR expects to meet its one-year inmate population reduction benchmark
of 155 percent design capacity, putting it in line with meeting the Plata Court’s mandate).
91. PENAL § 1170(h)(3).
92. BYERS, supra note 16, at 19 (“[P]ersons released from prison who are not required to be on parole,
are released on up to three years of Postrelease Community Supervision (PRCS).”).
93. See id. at 137–40 (listing all the statutes for felonies that do not fall into the serious, violent, or PC290 registerable categories, but still require prison time). Examples of such crimes include: the manufacture of
methamphetamine or phencyclidine in a structure where a child under sixteen years of age is present; a public
official aiding and abetting another in the commission of voter fraud; and driving with a willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of others while fleeing from a pursuing police officer. See id.
94. Id. at 17, 19.
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Community Supervision (PCRS) for up to three years. PCRS is similar to parole
96
in that felons must adhere to release conditions during the required period.
However, there are several major differences. The first is the agency in
97
charge of overseeing released felons. Under PCRS, the board of supervisors for
98
each county is required to designate a local agency to handle “supervision
99
policies, procedures, programs, and practices.” Unlike parole, the CDCR has no
100
jurisdiction over those released to PCRS. Another difference is that a county
101
cannot send offenders back to prison if they violate a condition of PCRS. Once
the designated agency revokes a felon’s PCRS, it can impose a maximum
102
punishment of jail time of up to 180 days. Alternatively, it can impose various
103
forms of lesser “community-based punishment.” The legislature expects that
104
the creation of PCRS will reduce the recidivism rate and increase public safety.
The PCRS portion of Realignment affirms this belief in stating that the old
system of “[reincarcerating] parolees for technical violations do[es] not result in
105
increased public safety.” With more than half of all inmate admissions into
106
CDCR prisons in 2010 being parole violators returned to custody, the PCRS
aspects of Realignment’s reform will also likely lead to a marked decrease in the
prison population as many would-be parole offenders under the old system are
dealt with locally.
3. The Increased Use of Good Behavior Time Credits
An additional change to California’s sentencing law is that almost everyone
sentenced to county jail, for either a county jail felony or a PCRS violation, shall
receive credit for four days of sentence time served for every two actual days of
107
time spent in conformity with the jail’s rules and regulations. Under this
provision, many eligible inmates will have their sentence times cut in half, as
108
long as they do not behave poorly while incarcerated.
This expands

95. PENAL § 3451.
96. Id. § 3453.
97. BYERS, supra note 16, at 19 (“Persons on (PRCS) are supervised by a designated county
agency . . . .”).
98. All counties have designated their probation departments to serve this function. Id. at 22.
99. PENAL § 3451(a).
100. Id. § 3457.
101. Id. § 3458.
102. Id. § 3455(c).
103. Id. § 3450(b)(8) (listing some examples of approved methods of “community-based punishment”).
See Part III.A.4, infra, for further discussion regarding community-based punishments.
104. PENAL § 3450(b)(1)–(5).
105. Id. § 3450(b)(3).
106. CDCR YEAR AT A GLANCE, supra note 89, at 16.
107. PENAL § 4019.
108. BYERS, supra note 16, at 79.
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California’s prior conduct credit law of counting every four actual days of
109
incarceration as six.
The court in Coleman suggested such an expansion in conduct credits as a
110
way California could reduce its prison population. The court found there to be
sufficient evidence that moderate sentence reduction tools such as conduct credits
111
do not increase recidivism rates or decrease public safety. The legislature has
followed the Coleman court’s recommendation by offering expanded credits to
112
those in county jails. This extension of credits may not lead to a noticeable
decrease in prison population compared to other Realignment provisions because
113
it does not expand good time credits for state prison inmates. However, it does
reduce the confinement time of most county jail felons, which helps relieve the
burden on county jail facilities that Realignment otherwise creates through its
114
increased dependence on their use.
4. An Increased Focus on Incarceration Alternatives and Other
“Community-Based Punishments”
One of Realignment’s most significant advances is its series of suggested
practices. Several sections of the law contain a list of “community-based
115
punishments.” These punishments consist of “evidence-based correctional
sanctions and programming encompassing a range of custodial and noncustodial
116
responses to criminal or noncompliant offender activity.” Among the examples
of such practices are home detention and monitoring, “mandatory random drug
testing,” work release programs, “substance abuse treatment programs,” and
117
“restorative justice programs such as . . . victim-offender reconciliation.” Under
Realignment, counties are encouraged to integrate these and other similar
118
programs into their sentencing options for low-level and PCRS offenders. In
fact, counties can use home detention to punish those convicted of county jail
felonies in lieu of jail time, with each day spent under house arrest counting as a

109. Id.
110. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL 2430820, at *89 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 4, 2009).
111. Id. at *89–90.
112. PENAL § 4019.
113. See id. § 4019(a) (applying conduct credits to various places of incarceration, including jails, but
not prisons). But see BYERS, supra note 16, at 82 (suggesting that Penal Code section 4019 applies conduct
credits to nonviolent prison felony offenders when spending time in jail while waiting to be sent to prison).
114. See BYERS, supra note 16, at 18 (stating that Realignment’s amendment to California Penal Code
section 4019 will allow for almost all offenders under the statute to receive fifty-percent of their sentence credit
through good time credits).
115. PENAL § 17.5(a)(8); id. § 3450(b)(8).
116. Id. § 17.5(a)(8).
117. Id.
118. Id. § 17.5(a)(6); id. § 3450(b)(6).
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day of incarceration towards the sentence. Additionally, counties can impose
other forms of community-based punishment for low-level crimes and as
120
intermediate sanctions for PCRS offenders.
Prior to Realignment, several counties, most notably San Francisco County,
employed several of these alternative, non-incarceration-based punishments with
121
great success. In 2010, San Francisco County contributed a far smaller
percentage of inmates to the state prison population than any similar-sized
122
county. Additionally, “[t]he city’s larger than average decline in crime during
the past decade indicates local non-incarceration and alternative policies for non123
serious offenders are effective.” By giving counties latitude to use alternative
punishment programs empirically proven to work, Realignment gives counties
124
the tools they need to meet the legislature’s goals.
B. What Realignment Gets Right: The Use and Promotion of Proven Recidivism
and Cost-Reduction Techniques
The changes brought by Realignment benefit California’s sentencing regime
125
by giving justice officials more tools in handling most felony offenders. By
diverting those with low-level felony convictions or post-release technical
violations away from state prison, California’s lawmakers recognize the
undesirability of sentencing laws that treat all felony offenders alike by sending
126
them all to the same institutions. In the years leading up to Realignment, many
experts decried California’s prisons as “crime schools,” where low-level
offenders, forced to commingle with more serious offenders, came back into
127
society more dangerous and more likely to reoffend. By separating low-level
offenders from the higher-risk inmate population, California mitigates this

119. Id. § 1203.016.
120. Id. § 17.5(a)(8); id. § 3450(b)(8).
121. See CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AB 109: CRIMINAL JUSTICE REALIGNMENT &
REFORM 7 (2011), available at http://www.cjcj.org/files/AB_109_Reform_Conference_Handout.pdf (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that counties that serve their low-level offenders locally, in part
through the use of alternatives to imprisonment, save the state nearly $750 million per year).
122. CDCR YEAR AT A GLANCE, supra note 89, at 18 (stating that San Francisco County contributed 0.9
percent to the prison population, while Sacramento and Fresno Counties respectively contributed 4.7 and 2.9
percent).
123. CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 121, at 3.
124. See supra text accompanying note 78.
125. See supra Part III.A (discussing the flexibility in sentencing under Realignment).
126. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(3) (West Supp. 2012) (“Criminal justice policies that rely on
building and operating more prisons to address community safety concerns are not sustainable, and will not
result in improved public safety.”).
127. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL 2430820, at *86
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (restating the testimony of several criminology experts claiming California’s
overcrowded prisons to be “criminogenic”).
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problem by cutting off a known contributor to recidivism. This change will
contribute to Realignment’s goals of reducing recidivism and increasing public
129
safety, while also leading to a decrease in prison population.
The expansion of earned time credits for county jail inmates will contribute
130
to the goal of cost reduction without leading to a decrease in public safety.
Some experts state that “a moderate reduction in an inmate’s length of stay in
131
[confinement will] not affect the deterrence value of imprisonment.” A study of
several states found that the use of good time credits does not lead to an increase
132
in recidivism.
Several states actually saw recidivism drop after
133
implementation. By releasing low-risk offenders earlier, the states “reduce[d]
the[ir] corrections budget burden . . . allow[ing] funds saved to be invested in
134
programs that reduce recidivism and help build safe communities.” California’s
counties should expect similar savings, thus giving them more resources to
implement the community-based punishments encouraged by the legislature.
The largest factor in Realignment’s potential success lies in the sentencing
flexibility given to county justice officials through the promotion of community135
The legislature has given counties
based punishment alternatives.
“unprecedented discretion in deciding how to best invest [their] realignment
[funds],” encouraging them to provide empirically proven programs for low-risk
136
offenders. Counties are not required to use any of these programs; however,
placing this discretion in their hands improves chances of success, as studies
137
show “that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to crime.” By encouraging the
use of sentencing options beyond incarceration, Realignment lays the
groundwork for a sentencing system that may meet the State’s goals of
recidivism and cost reduction, while maintaining public safety.

128. See PENAL § 17.5(a)(5) (stating that this change “will improve public safety outcomes among adult
felons and facilitate their reintegration back into society”).
129. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1943–44 (2011) (stating that Realignment’s reduction of
prisoners through the shift of low-level offenders to county custody supports conclusion that “the prison
population can be reduced in a manner calculated to avoid an undue negative effect on public safety”).
130. ALLISON LAWRENCE, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CUTTING CORRECTIONS
COSTS: EARNED TIME POLICIES FOR STATE PRISONERS 4 (2009), available at http://www.ncsl.org/
documents/cj/Earned_time_report.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
131. Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *89.
132. LAWRENCE, supra note 130, at 3.
133. Id. at 1.
134. Id. at 4.
135. Roger K. Warren, Viewpoints: Realignment Can Boost Public Safety, SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 13,
2011), http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/realignmentpublicsafety.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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IV. THE CHALLENGES AHEAD: WHAT STANDS IN THE WAY OF A SUCCESSFUL
IMPLEMENTATION OF REALIGNMENT
A number of the changes Realignment makes to California’s sentencing
scheme will achieve the legislature’s goals of reductions in cost, incarceration,
138
and recidivism. However, as formulated, Realignment also creates several
challenges that the counties must overcome to better facilitate the achievement of
the new law’s goals. This Part discusses some of these challenges. Part A
discusses the challenge associated with the unprecedented shift of inmates from
state to local supervision and how Realignment’s current financing scheme
exacerbates this challenge. Part B discusses the political challenges created by
the method Realignment uses to delegate decision-making to the counties.
A. From Overcrowded Prisons to Overcrowded Jails
Although untested, Realignment stands a far better chance of achieving the
goals of cost and recidivism reduction than the prior system, which sent all
felony offenders and parole offenders to prison, and drove up costs and
139
recidivism rates. Early reports suggest that Realignment is reducing the State’s
140
prison population in time to meet the court mandate. However, this new system
of punishment may create new problems as California incorporates it into the
141
current legal and political framework. Chief among the concerns is that
Realignment will shift many of the current problems associated with
overcrowding from California state prisons to county jails, which are far less
142
equipped to handle such an influx. Many counties do not have enough jail beds

138. See supra Part III (discussing how several of Realignment’s changes, such as the use of county jail
felonies and encouragement of alternatives to incarceration, will fulfill the legislature’s stated goals).
139. Id.
140. See Rina Palta, California’s Prison Population Drops, KALW NEWS (Jan. 4, 2012, 11:45 AM),
http://informant.kalwnews.org/2012/01/californias-prison-population-drops (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (reporting that, since its implementation, Realignment has reduced prison population by about 8,000
inmates, nearly hitting the reduction goal for the end of 2011 that will keep the State on track in meeting the
court mandate).
141. See Melissa Corker, AB 109 Brings New Inmates and New Challenges to County Jail,
SACRAMENTO PRESS (Sept. 28, 2011, 6:45 PM), http://www.sacramentopress.com/headline/58003/AB_
109_brings_new_inmates_and_new_challenges_to_county_jail (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(stating that counties are not being provided with enough funding in order to properly carry out Realignment’s
changes to the law and that the savings from Realignment will not reach the local level before the influx of
inmates will).
142. See David Greenwald, Advocates Express Concern that County AB 109 Plan Lacks Funding for
Mental Health Services, YOLO JUDICIAL WATCH (Oct. 26, 2011, 6:48 AM), http://davisvanguard.org/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4791:advocates-express-concern-that-county-ab-109-planlacks-funding-for-mental-health-services&Itemid=100 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting on
the lack of Realignment funding allocated to adequately maintain mental health care services for mentally ill jail
inmates in Yolo County); Corker, supra note 141 (reporting that there is no room in Sacramento County’s jails
or enough money to accommodate Realignment’s initial influx of inmates).
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to hold the projected influx of new inmates. While Realignment allows
counties to authorize their correctional administrators to offer alternative
144
punishments, many counties are using their Realignment funding to build more
145
jail space.
Shortly after the passage of AB 109, California’s legislature amended a 2007
bill that provides over seven-billion dollars in state funding for the construction
146
of new prisons and jails to make the construction money more accessible to
147
counties for building new jail space. The amendment reduces the percentage of
the construction costs that a county must pay out of its own funds from twenty148
five percent to ten percent, or less for some smaller counties. Additionally, it
gives preference to funding jail space development in counties that traditionally
149
have committed the largest number of offenders to prison. Taken together,
these provisions give counties an incentive to return to the pre-Realignment, proincarceration policies that led to the prison overpopulation problem in the first
150
place. State funding currently available to the counties for implementing their
151
Realignment strategies may not continue in the future. Nonetheless, the extra
funding for building jails has given CCPs the incentive to build more jail cells,
152
rather than using funding for proven alternatives.
This funding formula also penalizes those counties that choose to use their
funds to implement alternatives to incarceration over jail expansion by
153
withholding potential funding for these programs. In doing so, it harms
Realignment’s dual goals of cost and recidivism reduction by penalizing counties

143. See Toni McAllister, Early Release Possible for Inmates as Local Jails Fill, LAKE ELSINOREWILDOMAR PATCH (Jan. 7, 2012), http://lakeelsinore-wildomar.patch.com/articles/early-release-possible-forinmates-as-local-jails-fill (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting the Sheriff’s Department as stating
that they will be unable to retain all of the incoming inmates because it does not have enough jail beds).
144. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.016 (West Supp. 2012).
145. See Emily Harris, Op-Ed, Is Realignment an Opportunity? If so, Let’s Not Waste It on Building
Costly Jail Beds, CAPITOL WEEKLY (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.capitolweekly.net/article.php?
xid=105peby61sh96gg (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that thirty-four of California’s fiftyeight counties indicate plans for jail space expansions, while only a few counties, such as San Francisco, have
decided not to expand their jails).
146. AB 900, 2007 Leg., 2007–2008 Sess. (Cal. 2007).
147. AB 94, 2011 Leg., 2011–2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Harris, supra note 145 (arguing that the appropriation of Realignment funding in such a way
will do little more than perpetuate the cycle of offenders in California’s penal system, and will do so at a heavy
financial cost to the State).
151. See CONTRA COSTA CNTY., 2011 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REALIGNMENT FACT SHEET (2011), available
at http://www.furtherthework.com/CoCo_Realignment_Fact_Sheet.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (stating that adequate state revenue streams to the counties, though promised, are not yet guaranteed).
152. See Harris, supra note 145 (“34 of California’s 58 counties have indicated plans for expensive jail
expansions to date, while leaving programs and services as an ‘unaffordable’ afterthought.”).
153. Id.; Palta, supra note 140.
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that decide to implement proven crime-reducing punishment alternatives that
154
save the State hundreds of millions of dollars every year.
Even assuming there will be sufficient funding to build enough extra jail
space to hold the influx of new inmates, the earliest date any of this jail
155
expansion is set to occur is mid-2013, around the time California must meet its
156
full court-ordered population reduction. With the state-backed financial
incentives leading many of the most crime-heavy counties to build more jail
157
space that will not be ready soon enough, the inevitable result is in an influx of
158
inmates for whom there is no space. This reality may encourage counties to
resort to jail-population reduction techniques, such as releasing more arraigned
159
offenders on their own recognizance, rather than relying on bail. However, with
a large portion of state funding supporting counties in incarcerating county jail
felons, local justice officials have little incentive to use community-based
sentencing alternatives, thus encouraging the legacy of mass incarceration that
160
has proven itself untenable.

154. See CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 121, at 7 (stating that “self-reliant”
counties that have the lowest incarceration rates and employ the most incarceration alternatives, most notably
San Francisco and Contra Costa counties, save California approximately $746 million dollars per year by
serving their offenders locally).
155. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., AB 900 CONSTRUCTION UPDATE 6 (2011), available at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/FPCM/docs/AB-900-Construction-Update-Fact-Sheet.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (listing all the active jail construction programs under AB 900 funding).
156. The Court’s order states that California must meet the reduction to 137.5 percent design capacity by
June 27, 2013. 2011 Public Safety Realignment: The Cornerstone of California’s Solution to Reduce
Overcrowding, Costs, and Recidivism, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/
realignment/index.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
157. Harris, supra note 145 (stating that almost all of the 34 counties seeking to expand their jail space
are vying for the state funds available under the amended AB 900 allotment).
158. See Scott Weber, Counties Getting More State Prisoners than Expected, NBC L.A. (Nov. 16, 2011,
5:57 PM), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Counties-Getting-More-State-Prisoners-Than-Expected134001758.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that many counties are receiving higher
influxes of inmates than expected and, at this rate, the jails in Orange and Riverside counties will be full by
early 2012).
159. W. DAVID BALL, TOUGH ON CRIME (ON THE STATE’S DIME): HOW VIOLENT CRIME DOES NOT
DRIVE CALIFORNIA COUNTIES’ INCARCERATION RATES—AND WHY IT SHOULD 53, 76 (2012), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/162 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
160. See Rina Palta, California Invests Millions in New Jails to Deal with Overcrowding, KALW NEWS,
(Nov. 9, 2011, 5:32 PM), http://kalwnews.org/audio/2011/11/09/california-invests-millions-new-jails-dealovercrowding_1438449.html [hereinafter California Invests Millions in New Jails] (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (arguing that state funding exclusively for jail construction will continue California’s legacy of
mass incarceration, potentially leading to as many as fifty-eight Plata-Coleman cases).
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B. A Built-In Opportunity for Local Politics to Undermine the Legislature’s
Goals
The Realignment legislation gives local justice officials discretion in
161
handling the offenders who fall under their purview. This can prove to be a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, a county may tailor how it handles
offenders through evidence-based programs that fit the needs of the
162
community. However, county officials can also use this discretion to perpetuate
California’s pattern of incarceration by locking up many county jail-eligible
offenders instead of investing in programs that would better benefit offenders and
163
the community as a whole.
High-ranking officials in several counties claim that Realignment’s shift to
community-centric corrections will do little more than lead to a crime wave
164
across the state. Under Realignment, many of these officials are members of
the CCP executive committees, assigned to devise their counties’ plans for
165
implementing the new law. Upon creation of a plan, Realignment requires a
166
committee to present it to the county board of supervisors for approval. But
because a four-fifths vote by the board is required to halt the plan’s
167
implementation, it is difficult for opponents to defeat these plans.
Publicly elected county officials hold the majority of the positions on the
168
CCP executive committees and the entirety of every county board. A county’s
residents control the outcomes of these elections; candidates for offices such as
district attorney, sheriff, and superior court judge have no need to campaign
169
statewide. Overall, a majority of California voters see the prisoner release order
170
and California’s Realignment plan as a major political issue. A Field Poll
161. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.016 (West Supp. 2012) (authorizing counties to commit county jail
felons to home detention, electronic monitoring, and other alternatives in lieu of jail time).
162. See Marissa Lagos, Counties Dilemma: How to Use Funds for Inmates, S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 5,
2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/12/05/MNDF1M6CVP.DTL (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that several Bay Area counties are using their funding to send low-level
offenders to rehabilitation programs with much success).
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 25 (reporting that Los Angeles’s District Attorney and Sheriff both
predict a crime wave to occur in their county because of Realignment).
165. A county’s CCP executive committee must consist of the chief probation officer, a chief of police,
the Sheriff, the District Attorney, the Public Defender, the Presiding Judge of the superior court, and one other
department representative. PENAL § 1230.1(b).
166. Id. § 1230.1(c).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 1(b) (declaring that all counties are to have an elected sheriff,
district attorney, and governing body).
169. BALL, supra note 159, at 7–8.
170. MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, VOTERS CONSIDER SUPREME COURT’S RULING THAT
CALIFORNIA REDUCE ITS PRISON POPULATION SERIOUS 1 (2011), available at http://www.field.com/
fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rls2376.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). In this non-partisan Field Poll
survey, the authors find that seventy-nine percent of polled California voters consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s
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survey of California voters finds that a slight majority of California voters favor
171
Realignment’s major changes. The Poll finds that, while sixty percent of
Democrats support the plan, Republican voters overall believe that Realignment
172
is a bad idea, with nearly half opposing it and only thirty-eight percent in favor.
This suggests that in counties that are majority Republican, and counties that are
close to 50/50 in their political makeup, are more likely to vote for local officials
who oppose Realignment’s changes and are likely to ignore community-based
173
punishments. Additionally, voters are concerned with the budgetary issues
associated with Realignment, with many opposed to the increased use of county
174
funds to pay for it.
Moreover, sensationalist news stories—reporting almost daily on the early
release of sex offenders and other alleged injustices created because of
Realignment’s sentencing changes—may increase voters’ concerns about public
175
safety. In fact, officials in some counties are already using the issue as a
campaign platform, telling voters that Realignment will place their communities’
176
safety in jeopardy.
The public perception of Realignment in many counties revolves around the
177
issues of public safety and county finances. Because state financial incentives
are freeing up large amounts of money exclusively for counties to build new

mandate to have a serious impact and that fifty-one percent of voters support the Realignment plan, while thirtyseven percent oppose it. Id.
171. Id. at 2.
172. Id.
173. See California Invests Millions in New Jails, supra note 160 (stating that Realignment has not been
well received in many parts of the state and that Republican elected officials from these counties are trying to
exert political pressure on the issue by claiming that Realignment’s changes will lead to the early release of
violent felons).
174. DICAMELO & FIELD, supra note 170, at 4 (reporting that fifty-nine percent of California voters are
against raising new taxes to fund counties’ extra costs in handling the inmate transfer).
175. See, e.g., Jim Shultz, 6 Freed Despite Sex Crimes, REDDING.COM (Oct. 13, 2011, 11:46 PM),
http://www.redding.com/news/2011/oct/13/6-freed-despite-sex-crimes/ (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (reporting that six sex offenders who violated parole terms were quickly released from jail under
Realignment and that such light punishment could be “a harbinger of dire things to come”); Public Safety
Realignment Plan Causing Early Release of Criminals, CENTRAL COAST NEWS (Nov. 16, 2011, 6:28 PM),
http://www.kionrightnow.com/story/16055120/public-safety-realignment-plan-causing-early-release-of-inmates
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that Kern County, in one week, released over fifty parole
violators early, including thieves); Joe Matthews, Lindsay Lohan: Beneficiary of California’s Dysfunction, NBC
L.A. (Nov. 8, 2011, 12:48 PM), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/blogs/prop-zero/Lindsay-Lohan-Gov-JerryBrown-Realignment-133356448.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that, because of
Realignment, Lindsay Lohan spent only five hours in jail instead of the thirty days she was sentenced to).
176. See, e.g., Toni McAllister, Early Release Possible for Inmates as Local Jails Fill, LAKE ELSINOREWILDOMAR PATCH (Jan. 7, 2012), http://lakeelsinore-wildomar.patch.com/articles/early-release-possible-forinmates-as-local-jails-fill (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that, when announcing his bid for
a Riverside County supervisor seat, State Assemblyman Kevin Jefferies decried AB 109 as harmful to public
safety).
177. DICAMELO & FIELD, supra note 170, at 1–2, 4.
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jails, the option of making jail construction and further incarceration of
offenders a central part of a county’s Realignment plan becomes an attractive
179
option for CCP and county board members looking for reelection. The promise
of new jail space, mostly funded by the State, also appeals to local voters. With
such incentives in place, instead of utilizing Realignment’s changes to implement
proven recidivism-reducing programs, many counties may continue on the path
180
of mass incarceration, this time using jails instead of prisons. Realignment
provides many of the tools for California’s counties to remedy the state’s
181
problems with high recidivism and criminal justice spending. However, to
maximize potential to achieve California’s penological goals, Realignment will
need state-backed incentives that encourage counties to pursue proven
182
incarceration alternatives for incoming offenders.
Realignment’s current
financial and political incentives encourage a focus on incarceration, leading to
county policies that do little to decrease California’s recidivism problem and the
183
high costs associated with incarceration.
V. A SIMPLE FIX: A DIFFERENT FINANCIAL INCENTIVE STRUCTURE AND AN
ACTUARIAL RISK/NEEDS INSTRUMENT
Although Realignment’s current method of delegating funding and decision184
making to the counties in some ways frustrates the main thrust of the law, a
couple of minor changes and additions to California’s sentencing law and policy
could reduce the impact of these burdens. This Part suggests minor reforms,
made at little-to-no cost to the State, furthering Realignment’s stated goals of
185
cutting the recidivism rate, reducing costs, and improving public safety.
Realignment’s creation of CCPs in each county to implement its sentencing
plan essentially creates fifty-eight separate sentencing commissions in

178. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the state funding available to counties for jail construction).
179. See California Invests Millions in New Jails, supra note 160 (explaining that Republican party
plans on a platform of “attacking the governor for what they say is threatening public safety and dumping the
responsibility for prison overcrowding on the counties”).
180. See MIKE MALES, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CAN CALIFORNIA COUNTY JAILS
ABSORB LOW-LEVEL STATE PRISONERS? 4–5 (2011), available at http://www.cjcj.org/files/Can_
California_County_Jails_Absorb_Low-Level_State_Prisoners.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(stating that many low-level offenders respond better to community treatment and supervision programs
compared to incarceration).
181. See supra Part III.B (discussing the potential benefits Realignment’s changes have over
California’s prior sentencing law).
182. See supra text accompanying note 78.
183. See How Much Does It Cost to Incarcerate an Inmate in Prison?, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF.,
http://www.lao.ca.gov/laoapp/laomenus/sections/crim_justice/6_cj_inmatecost.aspx?catid=3 (last visited Mar.
23, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“[In 2009], [i]t cost an average of about $47,000 per year to
incarcerate an inmate in prison in California.”).
184. See supra Part IV (highlighting the inherent issues of having fifty-eight individual CCPs).
185. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5 (West Supp. 2012).
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California. The problem with this is the non-uniformity that it creates amongst
187
the counties. Some CCPs use Realignment’s financial incentives by funding jail
development, while others are trying to integrate further community-based
188
sentencing options. Counties integrating these alternatives subsidize those who
chose to develop jails, by saving the State money and not pursuing AB 900 jail
189
development funds. The problem that perpetuates this situation is that subsidies
are not available for counties that choose to invest further in proven evidence190
based practices and programs with respect to county jail felons. However, a
shift in how the state allocates the currently available criminal justice funding to
the counties can ameliorate this problem.
A. A Change in the Distribution of State Subsidies
California’s largest subsidy to counties for implementing Realignment
191
focuses exclusively on creating more space for costly incarceration. With the
state giving counties discretion in which programs and services to place their
criminal justice dollars behind, the State should reevaluate its current distribution
of the limited subsidy money for the counties with the goal of favoring programs
192
proven to reduce crime and costs. A redistribution plan needs to encourage
193
counties to use programs that show measurable outcomes in reaching this goal.
The State could do this by increasing the state funds available to successful
counties and by reducing the required proportion of contributions that those
194
counties must pay out of their own funds.
In determining how to distribute funds to encourage counties to invest in
proven sentencing alternatives for low-level offenders, the State could model its
structure on California’s 2009 Community Corrections Performance Incentives
195
Act (Act). The Act “provides state funding to county probation departments to
fund local evidence-based probation supervision practices for the purpose of

186. Weisberg, supra note 17, at 6.
187. Id. (“California could have had just one [sentencing commission], and it could have made that
commission a responsible and well-coordinated branch of state government. Perhaps recklessly, it chose this
other path.”).
188. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
189. See CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 121, at 1 (“[L]ocally self-reliant counties
have been penalized in the funding formula for allocation of realignment money and will have to develop new
innovative ways to expand their existing programs to encompass this new population; while state-dependent
counties are faced with a pivotal decision—to embrace best practices or perpetuate the mistakes of a broken
prison system at a local level.”).
190. Warren, supra note 135.
191. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 15820.911, 15820.917 (West Supp. 2012).
192. Warren, supra note 135.
193. BALL, supra note 159, at 71.
194. Id.
195. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1228 (West Supp. 2012).
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196

reducing recidivism and revocations among felony probationers.” Under the
Act, the State grants subsidy funds to counties based on a county’s performance
197
in reducing felony-probationer failure rates. Subsidy funds for a given county
are calculated by determining an estimated number of probationers successfully
prevented from being sent to prison multiplied by either forty or forty-five
198
percent of the costs to the State in sending a probationer to prison. The Act also
provides additional performance-based grants to counties that reduce their
probationer failure rates, giving those counties an extra five percent of the funds
199
the state saves as a result.
In its first year, this subsidy program has “resulted in a 23 percent reduction
in prison commitments [among felony-probationers], saving the state almost
200
$180 million in state corrections costs.” During the first year, the State only
201
invested $45 million to achieve this result. These savings make the program
202
self-sustaining. For the second year, the state reinvested nearly $90 million of
203
the savings to further the gains already made. Through these savings and
lowered failure rates, this program has made great strides towards achieving the
204
legislature’s Realignment goals in the probation arena. In fact, many CCPs
have begun focusing on alternative evidence-based practices in handling
probationers in an attempt to increase performance-based funding under the
205
Act.
Setting up a subsidy plan similar to the 2009 Act encourages county agencies
to develop practices and programs that are the most effective for their particular
206
communities. Additionally, the Act does not penalize those counties that use
their funds to experiment with innovative probation practices and policies and
207
fail to achieve their expected results. The largest part of its grant payment is

196. Warren, supra note 135.
197. PENAL § 1233.4.
198. Id. § 1233.3.
199. Id. § 1233.4.
200. Warren, supra note 135; see also CAL. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, SB 678 YEAR 1 REPORT 3
(2011) (listing the yearly probation failure rates since 2006, showing a 23% decline).
201. CAL. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 200, at 2.
202. See id. at 1–3 (stating that the state will redistribute about half of the savings to the successful
counties to continue their proven probation practices).
203. EDMUND G. BROWN JR., 2011–12 CALIFORNIA STATE BUDGET 36 (2011), available at
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/Enacted/BudgetSummary/CorrectionsandRehabilitation.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
204. See supra text accompanying note 78 (stating the major goals the legislature hopes to achieve
through Realignment).
205. See, e.g., DEL NORTE CNTY., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT 6–11 (2011) (stating all the
evidence-based measures Del Norte County’s probation department is utilizing to reduce probationer failure
rates).
206. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1233.4(d) (West Supp. 2012) (granting extra funding to those counties
that are able to reduce their probation failure rates to less than half of the statewide average in a given year).
207. Id. § 1233.3.
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based on the gains the county made, regardless of how small. If the State were
to implement a similar incentive structure to encourage counties to use
alternative sentencing practices for county jail-eligible felons and those on
PCRS, CCPs will be more likely to choose to develop further proven alternatives
to incarceration in their implementation plans. As a result, there will likely be a
drop in the statewide recidivism rate and offender management costs.
In developing a subsidy program, the State could expand the permitted uses
under its current prison construction subsidy to include funding for the
209
implementation of the legislature’s listed “community-based punishments” and
other evidence-based sentencing practices. Like under the 2009 Act, the State
could base its appropriation of the performance-based funds to a given county by
determining a county’s “failure rate,” those offenders who reoffend or violate
210
their PCRS conditions, and judging it against the statewide average. Based on
this rate, the State could determine the amount of money that a county is saving
211
the state and give back a percentage. Additionally, the State could provide
some of these savings to less-successful counties by offering subsidy funds for
the implementation of specific evidence-based sentencing practices that a county
212
is not currently adopting. About $125 million is already available in unneeded
prison construction money under AB 900 to act as part of a seed fund for such a
213
subsidy program.
The State would need to frame the subsidy in terms of money saved on
inmate costs for counties in order to build counties’ political will to not only pass
such a program through the legislature, but also for them to be more willing to
214
participate in it. This tactic proved successful for the 2009 Act, which passed
215
unanimously. However, the semi-voluntary nature of such a subsidy program
does not guarantee that it will persuade all CCPs to seek the state funding for
using alternative sentencing practices; they may simply continue to seek funding
for jail expansion, believing that continuing to incarcerate low-level offenders is
216
the most effective way to promote public safety. Therefore, in order to make

208. Id.
209. Id. § 17.5(a)(8).
210. Id. § 1233.
211. See id. § 1233.3 (setting out a tiered program where a county that saves the state money is entitled
to a payment by the state based on a certain percentage of the funds the county saves the state in a given year).
212. The State already provides similar funding to high achieving counties under the 2009 Act for the
specific purpose of bolstering evidence-based probation practices designed to reduce recidivism. Id. §
1233.4(c).
213. EDMUND G. BROWN JR., 2012–13 CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY 127 (2011),
available at http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
214. BALL, supra note 159, at 76.
215. Warren, supra note 135.
216. See California Prison Reduction Plans Are an ‘Unfunded Mandate,’ Says Police Chief Beck,
HUFFINGTON POST L.A. (Oct. 10, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/04/california-
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sure counties are more disposed to pursue the subsidy in an effective manner, the
State needs to guide them to the conclusion that jail time is not always an
effective solution to meeting the goal of handling low-level offenders in a
socially productive and cost-effective manner.
B. Adoption of an Actuarial Risk Assessment Instrument in Sentencing of
Lower-Level Offenders
One way to guide county officials towards corrections practices that best
meet Realignment’s three goals of public safety, recidivism reduction, and cost
reduction, would be to mandate statewide use of a risk/needs assessment (RNA)
instrument at sentencing. A judge can use an RNA instrument to help determine
the appropriate sentence for an individual low-level offender based on
determinations premised on three key principles: the risk the offender poses to
the public, the offender’s needs, and the probability that the offender will benefit
217
from a particular punishment or program. An effective RNA instrument would
account for personal characteristics empirically proven to have a bearing on the
218
offender’s likelihood to reoffend. Additionally, it would look at those attributes
and determine whether incarceration or a community-based sentencing
219
alternative would better serve the offender and the community.
The probation departments in several California counties have already
successfully used such an instrument in handling offenders on probation or
220
PCRS. However, such an assessment system would not be effective for making
sentencing determinations by a court, as there are more interests at play that are
221
not present in other criminal justice decisions. “Each state and local jurisdiction
prison-reduction_n_994500.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“[L.A. Police] Chief Beck called the
state’s prison reduction plan an ‘unfunded mandate’ that would result in longer emergency response times and
unsafe communities for Angelenos, as he would have to divert 150 police officers to probation duties instead of
street patrol.”).
217. PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, USING OFFENDER RISK AND NEEDS
ASSESSMENT INFORMATION AT SENTENCING 4–8 (2011), available at http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/
Services%20and%20Experts/Areas%20of%20expertise/Sentencing%20Probation/RNA%20Guide%20Final.ash
x (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
218. See id. at 5 (stating some personal attributes that have proven to be indicative of an offender’s
propensity to reoffend).
219. Id. at 6 (“[An RNA instrument] assess[es] an offender’s risk of reoffending, matching supervision
and treatment to the offender’s risk level, and targeting the offender’s criminogenic needs or dynamic risk
factors with the social learning and cognitive-behavioral programs most likely to effect change in the offender’s
behavior given specific offender characteristics.”).
220. See, e.g., S.F. CNTY. COMMUNITY CORR. P’SHIP, CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC
SAFETY REALIGNMENT & POST RELEASE CMTY. SUPERVISION 2011 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 15–16 (2011)
(describing the risk/needs assessment that the probation department must undertake); DEL NORTE CNTY., supra
note 205, at 7 (stating that the use of a risk/needs assessment instrument has helped to reduce probationer failure
rates, leading to a performance-based subsidy of $169,047 from the state for this small county).
221. CASEY ET AL., supra note 217, at 1 (“The use of RNA information at sentencing is somewhat more
complex than for other criminal justice decisions because the sentencing decision has multiple purposes—
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will [need to] determine its own best path.” Nevertheless, without a mandatory
uniform assessment instrument in place for all county jail-eligible offenders,
different counties will continue to vary widely in achieving recidivism reduction,
223
with the poorer performing counties costing the rest of the state millions.
Employing an RNA instrument would reduce recidivism and costs by
helping guide criminal justice officials towards the most effective outcome for
224
each individual offender. However, what offender characteristics would an
effective instrument take into account? Looking to Virginia, the first state to
implement RNA into sentencing determinations, is informative in figuring out
225
which factors are effective.
1. Determining Risk: Virginia’s Actuarial Assessment Instrument
In 2002, Virginia implemented a risk-based sentencing evaluation system
that requires trial courts to use a risk assessment report when evaluating
226
nonviolent offenders to determine the appropriate sentence. The Virginia risk
assessment instrument relies on several statistically relevant factors to “develop[]
227
profiles, or composites, based on overall group outcomes.” The instrument
creates a profile of an offender based on individual characteristics to determine
whether they fall into a “high-risk” category, to determine whether they are more
228
likely to reoffend. A judge can then use the “recommendation” that the data
229
gives to aid in making a sentencing determination.
Among the factors considered by a Virginia state court in determining the
appropriate sentence are an offender’s age, prior criminal history, educational
level, marriage status, employment status, gender, and the nature of and facts
230
surrounding the current conviction. The court gives a certain weight to each
factor in its determination, with some factors such as age, gender, criminal
231
history, and the nature of the current offense, weighing more heavily. Based on
the overall score, the instrument places an offender into a categorical grouping;
for example, those placed into a particular group being statistically as likely to

punishment, incapacitation, rehabilitation, specific deterrence, general deterrence, and restitution . . . .”).
222. Id. at 37.
223. CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 121, at 7.
224. See generally CASEY ET AL., supra note 217, at 7–8 (explaining how using RNA criteria at
sentencing aids in making a sentencing conclusion that will lead to the most effective outcome for the offender
and the community).
225. OSTROM ET AL., supra note 28, at 113.
226. See generally id. (describing Virginia’s risk assessment instrument).
227. Id. at 23.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 27.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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reoffend as others are within the same group. This instrument has proven
successful. Within the past decade, Virginia’s prison population has shrunk
drastically because of the increased use of shorter sentences and alternatives to
233
incarceration, leaving newly built prisons empty of inmates.
The use of statistically determinative factors of risk similar to those in
Virginia’s instrument could prove useful in California as a complement to the
subsidy discussed above. It would assist those in charge of local sentencing by
showing them an offender’s likely risk to the community, aiding judges and other
justice officials in realizing that incarceration for some low-level offenders might
not prove to be the most socially productive or cost-effective method of
234
intervention.
However, there is some backlash regarding Virginia’s use of certain criteria,
such as age and gender, in imposing differing penalties for different persons
235
convicted of the same offense. There are claims that certain factors may violate
236
equal protection; however, courts have yet to address this potential issue, likely
237
because the State has enough of a compelling interest in public safety. Since
experts generally consider these factors highly relevant to determining the risk
238
that an offender will reoffend, the state may justify their use on public safety
239
grounds.
Nevertheless, there are more pressing flaws in Virginia’s instrument: judges
use it only to assess an offender’s risk to public safety and it does not recommend
240
specific alternative punishments. Limiting such an instrument only to the
functions that Virginia uses it for would prove problematic to California because
Virginia did not design it to assess the needs of individual offenders, thus
232. Id. at 29.
233. Lawrence Hammack, New $105M Va. Prison Remains Empty, ROANOKE TIMES (Jan. 3, 2011),
http://hamptonroads.com/2011/01/new-105m-va-prison-remains-empty?cid=ltst (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
234. See Warren, supra note 135 (stating that the use of a validated risk assessment tool is more accurate
in determining the actual risk that an individual offender poses, and their needs, than unguided discretion
alone).
235. Emily Bazelon, Sentencing by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2005), available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2005/01/02/magazine/02IDEA.html?pagewanted=1 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
236. Id. See generally BRIAN NETTER, USING GROUP STATISTICS TO SENTENCE INDIVIDUAL
CRIMINALS: AN ETHICAL AND STATISTICAL CRITIQUE OF THE VIRGINIA RISK ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (2006),
available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=ylsspps_papers (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that several of Virginia’s assessment factors should not be used
at sentencing based on ethical grounds).
237. Bazelon, supra note 235.
238. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 28, at 27 (listing age, gender, and marital status as the top factors in
considering the risk a low-level offender poses under the Virginia risk assessment instrument).
239. See John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners,
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 430–32 (2006) (claiming that, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s
current jurisprudential framework for equal protection claims, the use of gender, age, and other non-race-based
factors are permissible for risk assessment purposes).
240. CASEY ET AL., supra note 217, at 9.
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reducing its effectiveness in addressing recidivism. Moreover, Virginia has a
far smaller population than California and its recidivism rate is historically far
242
smaller, staying constant at about twenty-nine percent, which indicates that
such a single purpose instrument might be inadequate for California’s more dire
situation.
A determination “that [an offender is] ‘high risk’ does not necessarily
243
translate to ‘need to incarcerate.’” A judge should use an RNA instrument to
aid in the determination, not supplant it, and the court should consider other
factors beyond static risk factors in determining what type of punishment will
244
result in the most favorable outcome for both the offender and the community.
In order to create an instrument suitable to California’s needs, the legislature
must necessarily consider other factors incorporating the needs of the individual
low-level offender and the county’s capacity to handle such an offender within
245
the community.
C. Beyond Risk: Determining Low-Level Offenders’ Needs in Specific
Communities
The factors identified in Virginia’s assessment instrument serve as a helpful
“baseline” for the creation of an instrument that meets California’s goals because
they are statistically proven to determine the likelihood that an offender will
246
reoffend, regardless of geographic location or circumstances. However, there is
no “one-size-fits-all” assessment instrument that will best evaluate any given
247
offender in any given community. In fact, one of the most important
determinations for a jurisdiction to make in choosing which factors to incorporate
into an assessment instrument is what its overall penological goals are, thus
allowing it to determine how the instrument will play a role in meeting those
248
goals. Through Realignment’s changes, California’s legislature has already
stated the goals of reducing recidivism, reducing costs, and improving public
241. Id.
242. BARON BLAKELY ET AL., VA. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT
ON THE VIRGINIA PRISON REENTRY PROGRAMS 4 (2007), available at http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/
research/documents/prisonerrentryinterim.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
243. CASEY ET AL., supra note 217, at 21.
244. Id. at 14.
245. See id. (stating other factors a court should take into account beyond the RNA instrument when
determining whether community supervision or other alternative sentencing measures would prove superior to
incarceration).
246. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 28, at 27 (listing the risk assessment factors that Virginia’s
instrument takes into account, many of which are immutable offender characteristics).
247. See Zachary Dal Pra, In Search of a Risk Instrument, in TOPICS IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS:
ASSESSMENT ISSUES FOR MANAGERS 9, 9 (2004), available at http://www.uc.edu/content/dam/uc/ccjr/docs/
articles/ticc04_final_complete.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that even if there were a
comprehensive assessment instrument, it would be too complicated to effectively and efficiently employ).
248. Id.
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safety. An effective RNA instrument would also need to “assesses dynamic
factors that can be used to guide treatment decisions and facilitate behavioral
change” to determine if a non-incarceration intervention would better serve a
250
county jail-eligible offender, the county’s public safety, and costs.
With the right factors and the right amount of weight given to each one, an
effective RNA instrument should be able to help a judge determine not only what
risk a low-level offender poses, but also what available intervention method will
251
best achieve California’s goals. One issue, however, in developing a uniform
instrument for statewide implementation is the differing needs and resources of
252
each county. While certain factors may hold constant from county to county
and some sentencing options may be available statewide, not all counties will
253
have the same resources to devote to certain types of offenders. Additionally,
some counties may have unique offender populations that local sentencing
officials need to take into account to get the most predictive value out of an
254
assessment. By creating a separate CCP for each of California’s fifty-eight
counties, Realignment gives local policy-makers more say in handling criminal
255
sentencing than ever before. California’s RNA instrument should reflect this
shift in policy-making power by giving county-level agencies and officials the
ability to determine how much weight to give to certain assessment factors and to
determine whether to insert additional, county-specific factors into the
assessment. Certain risk-needs factors may carry more weight in assessing what
type of intervention is right for offenders in one county than they do in other
256
counties. “[W]hat works in downtown Los Angeles may not work in Napa
257
Valley.”
For example, studies show that unemployed persons are more likely to
commit low-level offenses and that those who live in communities with high

249. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5 (West Supp. 2012).
250. CASEY ET AL., supra note 217, at 29.
251. See id. at 6 (“[A]ssessing an offender’s risk of reoffending, matching supervision and treatment to
the offender’s risk level, and targeting the offender’s criminogenic needs or dynamic risk factors with the . . .
programs most likely to effect change in the offender’s behavior given specific offender characteristics . . . is
associated with the greatest reduction . . . in the recidivism rate.”).
252. Id. at 14 (“Whether an offender is a good candidate for community supervision is a decision each
court makes, based in part, on the availability of effective local supervision and treatment resources available to
address the offender’s specific risk factors.”).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See Weisberg, supra note 17, at 6 (“[T]he CCP must be the cost-benefit analyst, information
manager, and overall administrator over vast portions of the criminal justice system.”).
256. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 217, at 30 (“Given the purpose for and potential judicial
consequences of using assessment information at sentencing, research must provide evidentiary support that the
tool can effectively categorize all types of offenders in the local population on which the instrument will be
used into groups with different probabilities of recidivating.”).
257. Id. at 32.
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unemployment rates are even more likely to do so. California’s counties have
259
widely varying unemployment rates. Therefore, while an assessment factor
based around an offender’s employment status may carry a certain amount of
weight in determining his likelihood to reoffend in one county, that factor’s
260
determinative strength may be entirely different in another. Additionally,
certain counties have offenders with distinctive needs, such as Shasta County,
261
which has a high rate of substance-abuse offenses. An RNA instrument should
be able to take into account the availability of resources within a particular
262
county to address such an offender in the most effective manner.
In order to encourage counties to determine the proper weight to give certain
factors in the statewide instrument and what additional, local factors to add, a
portion of state subsidy funding for Realignment implementation should be set
aside for counties to conduct validation studies. The validation process requires a
jurisdiction, such as a county, to test out an RNA instrument on a small sampling
of offenders that is representative of the local population to determine its
263
accuracy. By giving county officials the ability to build and try an instrument
for themselves, there is a greater chance of engendering trust in local sentencing
264
officials and community members that the instrument is accurate. By producing
greater community trust in the instrument’s accuracy, counties are also more
likely to “bolster and expand current evidence-based practices” as well as
“develop local community-based treatment resources in areas of need” based off
265
of the data that the instrument’s determinations develop. Additionally, counties
can use this data to help guide how much state and local funding to apply

258. See Steven Raphael & Rudolph Winter-Ebmer, Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime,
44 J.L. & ECON. 259, 271, 280–81 (2001) (stating that a 1 percent drop in the unemployment rate leads to as
much as a 2.4 percent decrease in the property crime rate and that areas with high unemployment generally have
much higher crime rates).
259. LABOR MKT. INFO. DIV., CAL. EMP’T DEV. DEP’T, MONTHLY LABOR FORCE DATA FOR COUNTIES
FEBRUARY 2012 4 (2012), available at http://www.edd.ca.gov/about_edd/pdf/urate201203.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (reporting the unemployment rate for each county in California, with Colusa County
having the highest rate at 27.1 percent and Marin County having the lowest rate at 6.6 percent).
260. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 217, at 31 (“[T]he target population(s) on which the [RNA] tool was
constructed and previously validated may not be representative of the local population; as a result, the tool may
not retain its predictive validity in the new context.”).
261. CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 121, at 5.
262. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 217, at 14.
The offender’s risk ‘score,’ at the time of sentencing may . . . be a relevant factor but should never
be determinative in deciding whether the offender can be safely and effectively supervised in the
community . . . . Whether an offender is a good candidate for community supervision is a decision
each court makes, based in part, on the availability of effective local supervision and treatment
resources available to address the offender’s specific risk factors.
Id.
263. Id. at 29.
264. Id. at 31.
265. Id.
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towards each available intervention method, helping to determine the most cost266
effective and socially productive way to funnel available funds.
VI. CONCLUSION
The federal courts, through the Plata litigation, have applied enough pressure
on California lawmakers to the point that the legislature has begun to reform over
thirty years of mostly ineffective sentencing laws. The past laws have created
high costs, a ballooning prison population, and a statewide recidivism rate of
267
nearly seventy percent. Many of the major reforms that Realignment makes to
California’s sentencing laws constitute a much-needed shift away from sending
low-level offenders to expensive incarceration in state prisons, instead creating a
268
newfound focus on punishing such offenders locally. These changes will not
only lead to further drops in the state’s overpopulated prison system, but should
also make great strides towards the state’s additional goals of cost and recidivism
269
reduction without leading to a drop in public safety. What is most likely to
prove to be Realignment’s greatest reform is its codification of the state’s
encouragement of the counties to use evidence-based sentencing practices and
policies that would steer many low-level offenders away from incarceration in
270
county jails.
However, merely stating that the state finds certain interventions effective in
meeting its goals is not enough to get certain counties to end sentencing practices
271
that focus heavily on incarcerating many low-level offenders. In bestowing
more responsibility and discretion in local governments in handling local
offenders, Realignment gives local government officials the ability to largely
272
ignore best practices and continue with incarceration-heavy policies. In fact, a
large portion of Realignment’s subsidy structure creates an incentive for counties
to rely heavily on incarceration by expanding the amount of money available for
jail construction and making it easier for counties to obtain funding for that
273
purpose. Additionally, the setup of CCPs as the main policy-making bodies for
implementing Realignment at the county level creates a lack of uniformity in
state-wide sentencing practices, with some counties choosing to implement
evidence-based sentencing policies and others opting to rely heavily on jail-based

266. Id.
267. See supra Part II (detailing the historical and legal background prior to Realignment’s enactment).
268. See supra Part III (providing a brief summary of Realignment’s major changes).
269. Id.
270. See supra Part III.B (highlighting the potential successes of Realignment’s changes).
271. See supra Part IV.A.
272. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the financial incentives of other legislation, and the lack of
financial incentives under Realignment, which tend to undermine the goals of Realignment).
273. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the political and financial issues with community-based programs
in the place of incarceration).
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interventions. The combination of this lack of uniformity with the incentives
created by the state subsidy structure costs the state millions of dollars and
275
penalizes counties that have progressive sentencing policies.
If Realignment’s reforms are to serve the State’s goals, the uses for which
counties can utilize available state funding need to change to include
performance-based payments to counties that successfully reduce their costs and
276
recidivism rate. There is already an incentive structure in place in California for
277
county probation departments that could act as a model. Additionally, to
persuade county officials skeptical of the effectiveness of sentencing alternatives
that such options are often more effective than jail, the state could mandate
statewide use of the uniform actuarial risk-needs assessment instrument in
278
sentencing decisions. The State could base its instrument off of a modified
version of Virginia’s instrument, giving counties the ability to modify the
instrument to make it more accurate in determining the best outcomes for those
279
within their local communities.
California is finally making strides towards a sentencing regime that can
reduce crime, costs, and prison population. However, such an unprecedented
transition to community-based corrections for a large population of offenders will
require much collaboration between the State and its counties and will not be
280
easy. As one of the drafters of Determinate Sentencing, the last major overhaul
of California’s sentencing scheme, said about that law: “only future experience
281
can provide any definitive answers” on how Realignment’s reforms will affect
California. However, with these changes, the achievement of Realignment’s full
potential as a model for effective community-based corrections will be one-step
closer to reality.

274. See supra Part IV.B (pointing out an inherit problem with CCPs, in that they may ultimately
undermine the goals of Realignment).
275. Id.
276. See supra Part V.A (proposing subsidies to incentivize counties’ participation in furthering
Realignment’s goals).
277. Id.
278. See supra Part V.B (proposing a RNA similar to Virginia’s risk assessment instrument to assist in
sentencing under Realignment).
279. Id.
280. See supra Part IV (highlighting the inherit issues of having fifty-eight individual CCPs).
281. Cassou & Taugher, supra note 36, at 30.
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